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cantilist sympathies, yet he occupies an intermediate position between the rigid exclusiveness of mercantilism and the freedom of trade of Adam Smith. He disposed of the fallacy that one nation could thrive only at the expense of another and condemned "going to war for the sake of getting trade" (p. 170). There is "something ridiculous", he said, "in the farce that a shopkeeper should bully his customers to compel them to deal with him against their interests" (p. 173), a good answer to the fallacy that trade follows the flag. He avoided the error of identifying national riches with money metal and opposed prohibitions on metal export. But he favored duties upon the import of foreign manufactures and upon the export of raw materials, and advocated bounties and premiums as encouragements to industry while in the infant stage. "Attempts ought to be made to wean this commercial child by gentle degrees" (p. 183).

His hostility to distant colonies had an economic motive. Colonies were costly, they added nothing to the trade advantages of the mother-country, they drew population from home, and they sought independence as soon as it was to their economic interest to do so. As early as 1749 he asserted that the American colonies would seek independence as soon as they no longer needed Great Britain's assistance. Tucker will be remembered by students of American history as one of the few men in England who consistently wrote and preached American independence, and who scouted the idea that the separation of the colonies would spell the ruin of England.

The fact that all of Tucker's published writings were of a controversial nature on current questions, and that his more extended and systematic work was never published, would explain the slight influence which this writer has exercised upon the development of economic thought. Dr. Clark insists, however, upon crediting Tucker with a considerable indirect influence upon the development of British economics in paving the way for the *Wealth of Nations*, and declares that he deserves a greater recognition than he has as yet received. By his thorough and scholarly monograph the author has done much to give Tucker this recognition. A complete and excellent bibliography of Tucker's writings is added.

FRANK HAIGH DIXON.

The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army. By LOUIS CLINTON HATCH. [Harvard Historical Studies, X.] (New York: Longmans, Green, and Company. 1904. Pp. viii, 229.)

THE effect of the democratic principle when applied to the administration of an army is rather ruthlessly shown in this monograph. The weakness of Congress, too, as a central government is clearly demonstrated in this close study of one of its most important functions. Until the ratification of the Articles of Confederation in 1781, Mr. Hatch shows, any state, and even any individual who was not in the actual

service of Congress, could refuse obedience to its commands, on the ground that it was unable to show any right to issue them. Even in the formation of the army, where Congress might assume the greatest power, it acted mainly through the state governments. So jealously did the state representatives in Congress keep the power in their own hands that, though a War Department was needed, the representatives in Congress at first administered military affairs themselves, frequently allowing even their committees only the authority to report, not to act. A war office became imperative, however, and in the summer of 1776 a Board of War and Ordnance was devised, and in 1777 a new board, not members of Congress, was appointed. In 1781 General Lincoln was made Secretary of War, thus securing the advantage of a single-headed department.

After accounting for the evolution of the Continental army and discussing the relations between Congress and the commander-in-chief, Mr. Hatch has contributed a valuable chapter on the subject of the "Appointment and Promotion" of officers, showing the jealousy of the members of Congress for the rights of their states. The several colonies wished not only to furnish officers for their troops, but also to make appointments for all ranks below that of brigadier-general. Washington was greatly hampered by the state jealousies. In the matter of a certain promotion, he wrote to Sullivan, "If in all cases ours was *one* army, or *thirteen* armies allied for common defence, there would be no difficulty in solving your question; but we are occasionally both, and . . . sometimes *neither*, but a compound of *both*" (p. 45).

The chapter on "Foreign Officers" is the least valuable in the volume, adding little to the account in Tower's *Lafayette* and that in Wharton's *Diplomatic Correspondence*. The following chapter, on "Pay and Half-Pay", is, on the other hand, a real contribution, treating clearly the subject of bounties, the real as compared with the apparent pay of the soldier, the inequalities of pay, which provoked so great discontent, and finally the long struggle in Congress over half-pay and the resolution to grant half-pay for seven years. To the assertion of Congress that the American soldiers received pay "greater than ever soldiers had", there is a commentary that the soldiers of New England were not, as in Europe, the wanderers of the city streets or half-starved peasants, but were frequently landowners or the sons of landowners who lived in a sort of rude comfort, and who could not see in poor food and six and two-thirds dollars a month a proper compensation for the camp dangers and hardships. The next chapter deals with the difficult question of "Supplying the Army", the mismanagement in the feeding and clothing of the army, and the consequent suffering at Valley Forge. It is, on the whole, the most accurate account we have, and is stated with moderation and without sentimentality. The mutinies of 1781 are well treated without, however, adding anything to our previous knowledge, or putting a new interpretation upon the events discussed.

The "Newburg Addresses" in the following chapter are, however, treated in a fuller and more conclusive manner. Mr. Hatch points out

that the long war and the intercourse with the French army had resulted in a diminution of pride in "Spartan simplicity", and an increased sensitiveness at being compelled to live in a manner unbecoming "an officer and a gentleman". Not only were there temporary discomforts, but there was anxiety for the future. The war would soon end, leaving them without money, credit, or business connections, but with themselves and families to support. Congress had been asked for half-pay, but the New England delegates were opposed, and, since no appropriation could pass Congress without the assent of nine states, it was doubtful whether the measure would succeed. As a result of this condition appeared the anonymous Newburg addresses urging the officers to compel Congress to do them justice. Mr. Hatch thinks that on the whole we may dismiss as unlikely Judge Johnson's theory of a plot of the officers to establish monarchy. More likely many of the officers hoped to compel Congress to retain them in service permanently. As to the civilian members of the conspiracy, it is held that they cared little for the claims of the officers, but desired political reform, hoping that the fear of military revolt would induce the states to increase the powers of Congress, or that Congress, with the support of the army, might assume additional powers itself. Gouverneur Morris was most seriously implicated in this plot, as his own correspondence shows.

The last chapter treats the "Mutiny of 1783 and Disbandment of the Army". The book closes with the general comment that the administration of the Revolutionary army is not one in which an American can take pride. "The people were often indifferent, the officers captious and quarrelsome, and Congress inefficient and negligent" (p. 196). Yet an excuse is offered for each, and Mr. Hatch urges that, though we may note their errors, we must not forget their sufferings and their achievements. The book is well organized and well written. It is a source study of high merit, and is well worthy its place among the Harvard Historical Studies. There is a valuable bibliography and a good index.

C. H. VAN TYNE.

The Cambridge Modern History. Planned by the late LORD ACTON, LL.D. Edited by A. W. WARD, Litt.D., G. W. PROTHERO, Litt.D., and STANLEY LEATHES, M.A. Vol. VIII. *The French Revolution.* (Cambridge: University Press; New York: The Macmillan Company. 1904. Pp. xxvii, 875).

THE reviews of volumes I and VII of the *Cambridge Modern History*, which have appeared in the *AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW* (IX, 142-147, 365-369), have determined the canons of judgment which must hold in respect to the fashion of coöperative historical production exhibited in this series of twelve volumes. The respective tasks of editors, contributors, and even of reviewers have been well defined; and in view of what has already been written it appears unnecessary on this